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Stony Brook, NY 11794, U.S.A. 
Al~traet--We consider a general c ass of dynamic games arising in strategic capital accumulation/resource 
extraction, and show that they have Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. 
The approach is new and relies on Topkis' results in lattice programming and Tarski's fixed-point 
theorem. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We consider a general model of strategic apital accumulation as an infinite-horizon sequential 
game, and establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies, with marginal 
propensity of consumption bounded above by one. The model is a straightforward extension of 
the well-known one-person version, used in optimal growth theory and in resource xtraction 
theory. 
However, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium existence results are available for such games. This 
paper proposes a lattice-theoretic approach, based on Topkis' results on parametric optimization 
and Tarski's fixed-point heorem, to analyse xistence issues in sequential games. 
The main result in this study has also been proved in Amir [1] using an infinite-dimensional 
version of Nash's [2] topological approach. The algebraic or lattice-theoretic approach, introduced 
here for the first time in analysing dynamic games, is extremely promising. Compared to the earlier 
classical approach, the analysis involved here is strikingly simpler and more insightful, as it is based 
on basic monotonicity properties of the model. Furthermore, the potential for generalization to
broader classes of sequential games including multi-dimensional versions is much more immediate 
under this approach. 
For one-shot games, a lattice-theoretic approach yielded new existence results in Topkis [3] and 
Vives [4]. These studies also contain several examples of games, arising in economic theory and 
operations research, to which this new method applies directly. 
The main objective of this note is thus to introduce a new powerful tool to approach existence 
questions in sequential/dynamic games, an area where most results so far are confined to very 
specific models, such as the linear-quadratic problem [5], The Great Fish War [6] etc. Finally, we 
note that lattice-theoretic methods also provide easily derived qualitative properties of Nash 
equilibria, as they have served extensively in optimization problems. 
The problem under consideration is as follows: the dynamics of common-property capital is 
governed by 
xt+ l=f (x t -c  ~-c~) ,  t=O,  1 . . . . .  
where c~ is the consumption by player i at stage t, i = 1, 2, with 0 <<. c~ <<. xt and c~ + c~ ~< xt. 
The payoffs are 
6iui(ci), i = 1,2. 
t=O 
As the actions available to one player depend on those taken by the other player, at any state, this 
is a generalized game, in Debreu's terminology. The assumptions on u and fare:  u is concave and 
increasing (alias isotone), f (0 )= 0, f i s  isotone, and there exists ~ > 0 such that f (x )< x for any 
x > ~. Consequently, the effective state space is S = [0, xm], where xm = max{x0, ~ }, regardless of 
the strategies of the two players. 
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We restrict consideration to stationary strategies (maps from S to possible consumptions). It is 
well-known that equilibria in such strategies remain equilibria when strategy spaces are enlarged 
to any extent. This follows from standard arguments in stationary dynamic programming [7]. 
A pair of strategies (~*, 7") satisfying 0 ~< y*(x) ~< x and y *(x) + ~*(x) ~< x, Vx e S, is a Nash 
equilibrium, if, for all starting states x0, we have 
and 
a~Ul[~l(gt)]ly ~, 
t=0 t=0 
r/> E 
t=O t=0 
Without the additional assumption u~(0)= + oo, i = 1, 2, the game may effectively terminate 
after a finite number of stages depending on the initial state. While our setting and notation clearly 
do not explicitly take such a possibility into account, the existence of an equilibrium in Markovian 
strategies i easily proved in such a case using the techniques presented here recursively. Hence, 
the assumption u~(0)= + ~ is needed. Our main result is: 
Main theorem 
The sequential game under consideration has a Nash equilibrium in stationary 
strategies which are lower semi-continuous, and have all incrementary ratios 
bounded above by one. 
2. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
This section provides a summary of all lattice-theoretic notions and results used in the analysis 
of the game at hand. Details can be found in Topkis [8] and Tarski [9]. 
A set S with a partial order ~>s (i.e. a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) 
is a lattice if the sup x vy  (or least upper bound) and infx  ^  y (or greatest lower bound) of any 
two elements x and y are both in S. A lattice S is complete of the sup and inf of any collection 
of elements of S are in S. It is densely ordered if 
Vx, yeS,  x>sy~3zeS with x>sz>sy .  
A real-valued function f on S is supermodular i f f (x  ^ y) +f(x vy)  >~f(x) +f(y), Vx, yeS.  
If S = R 2, this is equivalent to f(xl, Yl) - f (x l ,  Y2) >~f(x2, Yl) - f(x2, Y2) if (xl, yl) >I (x2, Y2). I f f  is 
twice differentiable, this is also equivalent to 6:f/t~x tSy >I O. 
Let P(S) be the set of nonempty subsets of S, and L(S) the set of nonempty sublattices of S 
(So is a sublattice of S if x v y e So and x ^ y e So, Vx, y e So, where v and A are defined in S). 
Define an order >/t on P(S) by : X/> Y is X and Y are subsets of S for which x E X, y e Y~x A y e Y 
and x vyeX.  L(S) is partially ordered by t> 1. An isotone function F from a partially ordered 
set T into L(S) is called ascending. Stated in symbols, F is ascending if x >~zY, a~F(x)cS,  
b eF(y)=S (with F(x) and F(y) sublattices of S) =,a vb eF(x) and a ^ b eF(y) (where A and 
v are taken in S). 
We are now ready to state a weak version of Topkis' theorem, and Tarski's fixed-point theorem. 
Topkis' theorem 
Let f be a real-valued supermodular function on A={(x ,y ) :xeX,  y eAx}, where X is a 
nonempty partially ordered set, A is a lattice; Axe L(A ) for each x e X and A~ is ascending on X. 
Assume further that Ax is compact and f(x, .) is upper semi-continuous for each x e X. Then 
Y(x) = {y :y eAx, y • argrnaxf(x, y)} is ascending in x, and for each x eX, Y(x) has a greatest 
element )7(x) and a least element y_(x), both of which are isotone on X. 
Given a function f and a subset X of its domain, let f (X)= {f(x) :x  e X}. A function f from 
S to S is quasi-increasing of f(sup X) I> inff(X) and supf(X)>~,f(infX), for every nonempty 
subset x of S. f is quasi-decreasing if supf(X)>~f(supX) and f(infX)>>,,inff(X), for every 
nonempty subset X of S. The reader can easily convince herself that these two notions are algebraic 
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equivalents of a function having no downward jumps, and a function having no upward jumps, 
respectively. 
Tarski 's  f ixed-point  theorem 
Let (S, ~>s) be a densely ordered complete lattice, f a quasi-increasing function and g a 
quasi-decreasing function from S to S, such that 
f ( in fS) /> sg(infS) and g(sup S) >/if(sup S). 
Then P = {x eS  : f (x )= g(x)} is nonempty and (P, >~s) is a complete lattice. 
3. PROOFS 
First, we derive some essential results satisfied by the best response optimization problem of 
Player I, when Player II's strategy is fixed as a function h : S--,• satisfying the requirements: 
O<.h(x )<~x,  h is lower semi-continuous (or l.s.c.) and h(x) -h (y )<.x -y ,  for all x, y in S 
with x >/y. 
Let the value function associated with responding optimally to h be 
oo 
Vh(x) = sup ~ 6]U,(C,), 
{ct} t= o 
when x0 = x and ct + h (x,) <<, xt, t = O, 1 . . . .  
Let B(S)  be the complete metric space consisting of bounded functions from S to R with the 
uniform distance. The mapping T: B(S) - *B(S)  defined by 
v--*supremum {ul(c) + 6v[ f (x  - c - h)]} 
O<~c<<.x-h(x) 
=supremum{uj (x -y -h )+6v[ f (y ) ]} ,  with y=x-c -h ,  (3.1) 
O <~ y <~ x - h(x) 
is well-known to be a contraction, whose unique fixed-point ist (cf. Blackwell [7]) 
Vh(X)= max {u, (x - -y - -h )+6VhLf (y ) ]} ,  x~S.  (3.2) 
O<~ y<~ x -h(x )  
Note that the max in (3.2) is justified since, by standard maximum-type theorems (Bank et al. [11, 
Chapter 4]), Vh is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.), and hence, so is the maximand in (3.2). 
We are now ready for the two preliminary results of this section. 
Lemma 3. I 
The maximum selection )~h from the optimal investment policy Y* is isotone and u.s.c, in x. 
Proof. We aim at applying Topkis' theorem to the maximization i  (3.2). First, we show that 
the maximand is supermodular in (x, y). Let x2/> x, and y2 >/Yl, be fixed, with 0 <~ y~ <<, x~ - h(x~), 
i = 1, 2. Clearly, since h(x2) - h(xO <~ x2 - Xl, we have, for i = 1, 2, 
X2 - -Y l  - -  h (x2)  i> x i - -  Y~-  h (x i )  >1 X l  -- Y2 - -  h(X l ) -  
Hence, there exists 2, with 0 ~< 2 ~< 1, such that 
x2 -- Y2 -- h(x2) = )-[x2 - y, - h(x2)] + (1 - 2)[x, - Y2 - h(x/)], 
and 
xl - -Yt  -- h(x,)  = (1 - 2)[x2 -Y l  - h(x2)] + 2 Ix  I - -Y2 - -  h(x0]. 
Now, using the concavity of u twice, 
UI[X2 - -  Y2 - -  h (x2)] + UI [X I  - -  Yl -- h(x0] I> ul[x2 - Yl - -  h(x2)]  + Ul[Xl - -  Y2 -- h(xl)], 
?We are implicitly assuming u~(0)> -~ to ensure uniformly bounded one-period rewards. In case u(0)-- -oo  (e.g. 
u is the log function), (3.2) still holds although V h is not necessarily the unique solution to it (cf. Bertsekas [10, 
Chap. 7]). 
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which establishes that ul is supermoduiar in (x,y). The isotonicity of 37h in x follows from 
Topkis' theorem upon observing that the feasible set [0, x -h (x ) ]  is ascending in x, when 
h(x) -h (y )<~x -y ,  for all x, y in S with x ~>y. 
To establish that 37 is u.s.c., we appeal to a one-sided version of maximum-type theorems (Bank 
et aL [10]) as follows: since h is 1.s.c. and has only downward jump discontinuities, h is clearly 
right-continuous. Hence the set-valued function Y* is u.s.c, from the right (i.e. x~x,  y ,e  Y*(x,), 
y~--.y=~yeY*(x)). Since 37(x)=max{Y*(x)} and 37 is isotone, it is easy to see that )7 is 
right-continuous. [] 
Let K be an upper bound on all possible payoffs in our game, and define C(S) = {v: S ~R;  v 
u.s.c, and increasing, and v(x)<<.K, Yx e S}. Then every pair (el, v2)eC(S)xC(S)  induces a 
parametrized family of generalized games Gx(v~,v2) where the payoff to Player i is 
ui(c`.) + 3`.v`.[f(x - c I - c2)], i = 1, 2, and, for each x eS, the actions satisfy ci I> 0 and cl + c2 <<. x. 
Note that Lemma 3.1 holds if Vh is replaced by any v eC(S).  
Lemma 3.2 
Let hi:S--*R be such that O<~h`.(x)<<.x, hi is l.s.c, and h`.(x)-h`.(y)<<.x-y for all x>>.y 
in S; let .17,- be the maximum best response .selection to hi in the game G~(vt, v2), i = 1, 2. Then 
h2(x) >>. hi(x), Vx ~ S='y2(x) ~< 371(x), Vx ~ S. 
Proof. The conclusion follows again by invoking Topkis' theorem, once we establish that, for 
each x~S,  the maximand in (3.1) is supermodular in (y, -h ) .  To this end, note that the term 
Ul (X -y -h )  is supermodular in (y , -h )  according to the same argument as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.1. Also, the feasible set [0, x -h ]  is ascending in ( -h )  for each fixed x~S.  [] 
Denote the strategy space, for both players, by L. Thus 
L={) , :S~R,y(0)=0,? l . s . c .  and 7(x) - ) , (y )<~x-y  Vx, yw i thx~>y}.  
Define a partial order ~>t or L by 7~/> t72 if 7~(x)>i ~2(x), ¥x ~S. Then (L, ~>1), or simply L, is a 
densely ordered complete lattice (a proof of this fact would be identical to that establishing the 
space of all possibly defective distribution functions as a lattice with the same properties, a 
well-known fact). Finally, we define two maps from the lattice L x L into itself: 
S:LxL~LxL  
(g,h)--,((g +h)^x,(g +h)^x), 
where x [the identity function] is the lowest upper bound of L. Given (vt, v2)EC(S)xC(S), let 
R : (g ,h )~(g '+h,g+h' ) ,  
where g' and h' are the smallest functions satisfying: 
and 
ul [g'(x)] + 61 v, [ f  (x - g'(x ) - h (x))] >i u, (21) + 3,vl [ f  (x - 2, - h (x))] 
u2[h'(x )] + 62v2[f (x - g(x ) - h'(x))] I> u2(22) + 62v2[f (x - g(x ) - 22)], 
for all feasible 2t and 22. 
In other words, g' and h' are the minimal best response selections to h and g respectively in the 
game Gx(vt, v2). Note that 37h(x) = x - g'(x) - h(x) and ~, = x - g(x)h'(x). Since the )Ts are u.s.c., 
g' + h and g + h' are l.s.c. By Lemma 3.1, both g' + h and g + h' are in L. 
Now, S is clearly isotone. By Lemma 3.2, R is also isotone with respect o i> t. Also, S is clearly 
continuous (hence quasi-decreasing). Furthermore, R(0, 0) is strictly higher than S(0, 0 )= (0, 0) 
(note that this follows from well-known results in the one-player version of this problem, but is 
also rather intuitive). Also, R (x, x) = S(x, x) = S(x /2, x /2) = (x, x ). All the hypotheses in Tarski's 
fixed-point heorem are satisfi~l. Hence the maps S and R have an interaction point, which is easily 
seen to be a Nash equilibrium of  Gx(v~, v2). 
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Furthermore,  the set of  equilibria of  Gx(/)l, 1)2) is a complete lattice. Hence, in particular there 
exists a smallest equil ibrium (g, h), to which corresponds (V~, V2), the largest of  the equil ibrium 
payoffs (since h, >1 t h2 =* V~,(x)  <~ V~:(x),  Vx  ~S,  VhteL ,  i = 1, 2). Define the single-valued map 
T: C(S)  x C(S)  ~ C(S)  x C(S)  
(v,, v2)-- (V,, V2) 
Proof  o f  main theorem 
It follows from standard results in stationary dynamic programming that any fixed-point o f  T 
is a Nash equil ibrium payoff  pair, and the associated stragegies a Nash equil ibrium of  the original 
game. Endowed with the weak topology, C(S)  is a compact  metric subset of  the vector space of  
functions of  bounded variation on S. To apply the Schander-Tychonof f  fixed-point theorem, it 
remains to show that T is  weakly continuous. Let (vT, v[ ) ~ (v~ , v2 ), ( V~, V~ ) = T(v~ , v[ ) ~ ( Vl , V~ ). 
We have to show that (Vi, V2) = T(vl ,  v2). We have, say for Player I, for all ~ ~[0, x - hn(x)], with 
yn(x)  = x -- hn(x) - gn(x), 
VT(x) = ul [x - -yn(x )  -- h~(x)] + 61 r] '[f(y~)] I> Ul [x - ~t - h~(x)] + 61VT[f(~t )]. 
Taking weak limits (see Amir [1]), 
V,(x)  = ul[x - y (x )  - h(x)] + 61ViLf(y)]  >>- ul[x - • - h(x)] + 61Vl [f(a)],  V~t ~[0, x - h(x)]. 
A similar argument for Player I I  finishes the proof. 
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